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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND PEP IN IT ION OP T'.RMS USED
The contemporary vogue of interest in man's destiny
is typical of crisis times. Augustine's City of god appeared
as a work of consolation during the barbarian invasion of
Rome* Hen since have shown interest in the prognostic value
of history. This interest heightens whenever the status quo
1b threatened, for basically, man lives in a three-fold con
text of past, present and future. He thrives on the feeling
that these are intimately related. Whenever the solidarity
of this trilogy is broken man is faced with the problem of
reinterpreting his whole existence. It is this very process
of reconsideration which characterizes the whole intellectual
scene today. If men are not seeking new insights to the mean
ing of history they are seeking new arguments for the old
ideas of racial experience. In this atmosphere of readjust
ment a statement of the Christian view of history should have
great apologetic value.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem. It has been the purpose of
this study (1) to survey certain significant Christian think
ers with a view of establishing what is normative in the
2Christian analysis of history as indicated particularly by
Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Edwards; (2) to evaluate the
contributions of Relnhold Siebuhr In the light of his unique
relation to the study in-as-much as he has reacted against
the liberal-Christian view of history, which excludes all
concept of the curse and who, in consequence of this has won
distinction both here and abroad as the foremost American
philosopher of history; and (3) to organize the resulting
fragments with a personal view of the curse as the key to
history.
Importance of the study. The critic* 1 interest in
civilization has been widely indulged, yet, in spite of this
nearly universal participation, no statement from the evan
gelical Christian quarter has been forthcoming. But Bible-
centered Christianity has always been vitally concerned with
history both as to origins and ends. It is incumbent, then,
that serious effort be invested In focusing the latent con
cepts of the Christian faith upon the philosophy of history.
In this study an attempt has been made to indicate a very
rich reserve from which to approach the study of civiliza
tion and to discriminate between the popular ana the historic
Christian analysis of history.
3II. DEFINITION OF TERMS USID
The purge* The curse has been regarded throughout
this study as that disharmony sovereignly introduced into
nature on account of sin�a kind of secondary or oblique law
of nature. It was taken to be inclusive of the initial dis
harmony pronounced at Eden and the progressive disharmony
revealed in the tower of Babel and all those novel enmities
ever arising in nature against the security and complacency
of man. Death, the struggle for survival, alienation from
God 's presence, language barriers, adversity of climate and
seasons, pain, etc., were seen as components of the curse*
But the curse was not identified with every incident of dis
tress, for a society of fallen men would surely engender
sufferings of its own, even though free from a superimposed
eurse. Rather it has been understood as th*t adverse, im
personal factor working uniformly and universally In nature
to make a discriminative rift in what would otherwise be a
peaceful and friendly universe.
History. History has been interpreted simply as the
indiscriminate account of man's life in its racial extent.
The origin of man has been thought of as a creation event
of rather recent date. The primitive civilizations have
been regarded as evidence of departure from the created norm
rather than remnants or evidences of antiquity. While this
4may be regarded as unwarranted in that it goes too far in
solving the problem at hand, it may also be defended in
that the objective of the study has been to show only the
implication of the doctrine of the curse for a philosophy
of history and not to work out the problem of civilization
in its entirety.
Mature. Nature has been looked upon as the mundane
or phenomenal stage on which history la enacted. Xt has
been interpreted as that amoral constituent of man's ex
perience having no self-determining qualities of its own
but rather as dependent for its continuity upon God's will
as expressed in natural law, nevertheless remaining wholly
objective to God.
III. PROCEDURE AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
Procedure. This investigation has been conducted in
accord with the library method, lae pertinent writings of
the several theologians involved have been surveyed in a
selective fashion in order to glean from them anything rel
evant to the understanding either of the curse or of history.
Also, soae oritical material on the work of these same theo
logians has been reviewed in order to confirm and sharpen
the interpretation of the primary sources.
The limit of the study has not permitted an inductive
research into history itself but has required a dependence
5upon certain general am' established principles previously
worked out In the field of historiography. Such principles
as the controlling power of nationalism, the causal relation
In culture and environment, the identity of epochs, etc..
may be cited as examples. In keeping with the very purpose
of the paper to indicate certain implications of the curse,
the study has been more doctrinal and deductive than histor
ical and empirical.
Presuppositions. The conviction of this paper has been
that of theism as held by evangelical-Christians. Therefore
Genesis has been treated as a reliable and literal aocount
of man's origin; providence as God's mysterious and personal
ordering of natural and humeri history; the destiny of man as
the triumph of the saints with Christ at His second coming
according to the premillenlal definition; progress as the
self- improvement of the race within limits predetermined by
the endowments of man In creation. And where the study has
involved anthropology it has been that which recognized man
as the superlative of this creation order but as fallen. The
determinism of one branch of the evangelicals has been rejected
for that doctrine of freedom in nature and in man known as
Armlnianlsm.
CHAPTER II
Till CONTRIBUTION 0? AUOUSTIHE
I. AUGUSTINE'S PRESUPPOSITIONS
Augustine's Intellectual indebtedness to Platonlsst
has frequently been recognized. Emphasis has characteristi
cally fallen upon the epl a topological implication of his
borrowed idealism. But there is a further implication. It
has to do with his interpretation of history. Augustine's
basic problem in examining history was to resolve the prob
lem of evil without Impugning the Justice of God.1 This is
true of his treatment of society and nature in both. The
City of Sod, and, The Order. Yet the problem of evil, in-
so-far-as it affooted Augustine's consideration of the
meaning of history, was In reality the problem of man's
beatitude. Evil, historically considered, was more than
anything the grand impediment to man's temporal felicity
and eternal blessedness. Just as Plato turned to idealism
for relief from solipsism and found critical certitude"5 so
1 Saint Augustine , The City of god, translated by
John Healey, (Edinburgh; John Wmt^XWS), I, 567.
2 Ibid., pp. 143-144,
5 Francis MaoDonaId Cornford, Plate's Theory of Knowledge .
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tuubner and Co. M.'lVSi)".
pp. 243*268.
7Augustine avoided pessimism and embraced Christian optimism
through epis temologic a 1 idealism.
It is important to know how Augustine used Platonism,
i.e. how he actually conceived of history, before investigat
ing the proper concern of this study, namely the place and
importance of the curse in the Augustinian historiography.
In Platonism the eternal forms stood back of the
phenomenal and gave it validity as it, the phenomenal, parti
cipated in the reality of these universale. It was aa if a
great division existed with all reality on one side and the
universe, the mere shadow of reality, on the other. Augustine
retained this way of looking at things but substituted the
Christian Ood for the Platonic universale.4 Moreover, he
followed the Platonio lead in fixing the place of evil in the
universe. Plato had described the cosmos as an organism hav
ing a soul and thus bein^ moved by itself� the soul for the
Greek being the principle of motion. Furthermore it was a
complete organism of complete parts, yet single, nothing be
ing left over out of which a rival, second cosmos might
develop.5 This is to say that Plato thought of the universe
as a being itiich exhuasted within its own structure all
4 Augustine, op. oit. , p. 279.
5 W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy.
(New York: Haroourt, Brace and Co., pp. 167 ff.
8possibilities. These possibilities were &ood and could not
be otherwise seeing they were tho work of a good creator.
nenoe, evil, vnhatever it la, must lie outside tills realm*
It ana only have the status of non-being. It was in keeping
with this argument that Augustine e,$> lamed evil* He stid
that evil #as not a part of order�nob a part of the created
universe* Bather, it was the absence oi some Intended good,
it is non-being* Moral evil vtfas different. It was aian's
departure from the divine Idas for man.7 3eatitade consisted
in the individual's approximating the universal. This then,
is the Augustinlan framework cf history. It is a configura
tion. The universe, Cod and the Platonic gap between them
make up the entire pioture, But there is one thing more.
Christian morallsm and its consequence, optimism.
In following Platonism Augustine tended to regard the
universe as static. Christianity, however, inserted a note
of societal change or at least conflict. Idealism sot the
stage of history but Christianity provided the meaning and
purpose of history. That meaning was moral? it involved
the universal struggle between righteousness and unrighteous
ness.
6 Sainfc Augustine, The Order, translated by Robert P.
Russel, (Hew York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service Co.,
Inc, 1942), pp. 107-117.
7 SMn* Augustine, The City of Ood, pp. 280-286.
9Evil waa a threat to Ood and xsan was created in order to ex
tend the conflict* It was Sod's purpose to meet and conquer
evil in the sphere of human history*0 Augustine considered
it hereticel to think that evil might he victor over God but
insisted that evil was sufficient to harm God else history
had no purpose.9 History then, was that sphere where good
and evil were rivals for man's allegiance and where the whole
moral order, God, angels, men and devils, converged in a ti
tanic struggle. Prom the beginning the rsee had divided in
to two hostile camps, the city of the world, Babylon, and the
city of God , Jerusalem. Cain was the progenitor of the first
snd Abel the progenitor of the second.*0 The city of God,
Augustine believed to be moving toward eventual, apocalyptic
victory and all providence, indeed the inner scheme of his
tory, was directed toward this end,1*
Here, then, in this combination of Platonic idealism
and Christian morallsm emerges the Augustinlan understanding
of beatitude. It is Augustine's most basic idea in the con
sideration of history. Beatitude, philosophically, stands
8 Augustine, The Order, p. 157,
9 Loo, oit.
10 Augustine, The City of God, II, pp. 54-55.
11 Ibid.. I, 567.
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for all that belongs to the Idea of man, that which Ood in
tended man to be. Morally It stands for all man owes Ood by
way of duty and honor. It has to do with what man is In him
self and what his duties are. The achievement of beatitude
is both self-realization and allegiance to Ood. The signi
ficance of this for the philosophy of history is simply that
all men, good or bad, are, according to Augustine, in search
12
of beatitude. Some, however, search for it falsely and
this Issues in moral evil. Finally, Augustine's first con
cern with history, the unravelling of the problem of natural
and moral evil, has yielded its full answer, natural evil,
as Indicated above, is merely the nether aspect of the ex
haustive effect of the Perfect Cause and is necessary to the
hlerarchial configuration. Moral evil Is failure to achieve
beatitude. In the light of these presuppositions Augustine
undertook the study of history and his monumental work, The
City of Ood. is the classic result.
Augustine faced the problem of history in a rather
special way. The dissolution of the Roman Empire within his
own lifetime had provoked general skepticism concerning the
permanence of society. It was insisted that the overthrow
12 R. H. Barrow, Introduction to St. Augur tine The
City of Ood (London: Paber and Paber Umlted. 1950), p. 163 .
11
of paganism, by the adoption of the new religion, Christiani
ty, was the cause of Rome's decline. Essentially this was
the claim that the pagan deities were to be honored above the
Ood of Christianity, that in their hands rested the true fe
licity of nations. Consequently it became the task of
Augustine, the apologist, to show the true nature of societal
permanence and to exonerate Christianity from the charge of
having undermined Roman solidarity.15 This is to say that he
undertook to demonstrate the validity of his idea of beati
tude. This demonstration was conducted In a labyrlnthian
argument against paganism. Bis method was to contrast pagan
ism end the Hebrew-Christian religion in order to emphasise
the inherent superiority of the later as an lnseperable con
stituent of beatitude. He asserted that society gained per
manence, though not necessarily prosperity, in direct propor
tion to its adherence to this true religion of the one true
14
Ood. Beatitude for man and nations was inseparable from
the Hebrew-Christian revelation. Obviously, then, Augustine's
practical interest dominated his theoretloal interest in this
study.
13 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
14 Augustine, The City of Ood, I, 279,
12
II. HIS CONCEPTION OP THE CURSE
Actually Augustine did not develop the theme and im
plies tions of the curse except indirectly for it was not a
main concern with him. Yet he did give it incidental treat
ment. Rather than a formal expose of the doctrine of the
cur e, there is found instead a series of comments on various
phases of suffering. But these comments are not merely ran
dom entries in a catalogue of human misery. They are criti
cal observations upon the nature an-^ providential intent of
suffering- Thus they bear upon the purpose of this study
and are central to the question. "What is the significance
of suffering for historiography?"
Suffering is essentially penal. It was instituted as
part of that divine economy designed for the eventual recov
ery of the race. Suffering came first to those who sinned
first. Adam and Eve were confronted with two peculiar dis
ciplines of adversity: (1) they were confounded with their
own nakedness and (2) they were made slaves to sin through
their own carnal minds15 and subjected to spiritual and physi
cal death.1� These penalties were transmitted to the entire
15 Ibid.. II, 9.
16 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
15
race* Yet Augustine carefully distinguished between the
saint and the sinner as s subject of suffering. The saint,
like the sinner, must suffer the first death but the saint
is freed from the second death which alone is ruinous of be-
17
atitude. Moreover, though the saints do indeed face death
as a punishment of racial sin, death to them is not mere pun
ishment, It is a means to the improvement of faith. *e It is
for this reason that God has not removed the penalty of death
from the regenerate. Through obedience unto death the Christi
an strengthens his devotion to the good and shows himself wor
thy of reward. If death were done away for the redeemed then
would the Insincere seek favor with God, not for love of the
good but for fear of the experience of death.
There is also suffering of a less specific and pre
dictable kind which the wicked are made to endure. It is
the direct wrath of Ood* This, by definition, is penal. The
category Is general but Includes those various afflictions in
which, "...the Lord (as His prophets have threatened) doth
lay His heavy hand upon the world I
10 Since they are widely
dispersed it la inevitable that the saints must Inadvertently
feel the sting of these psnalties together with those for whom
l*7 I^ld.. I, 15.
18 Ibid*. P� �34.
19 Ibid., p5 10,
14
they were intended, However, the penal nature of this suf
fering, while extended to the wicked, is modified in the ease
of the righteous* The same untoward event may be bad to the
bad and good to the good* This la not to say that it is en
joyable but that it is good Just as correction or other means
of improvement, however troublesome, are good*
Moreover, even as nature is frequently turned against
the wicked so also it is turned against the righteous. But
the inflicting agent is not (Sod, The devils (Augustine's
name for the fallen angels ) have control over nature to the
extent that they may Impose plagues and hardships of various
kinds upon the children of Ood, This they do in order to
divert the worship of the saints from the true Ood to them*
selves.80 Herein is a very large part of the Augustlnlan
explanation of the rise end power of paganism, i.e. he re*
garded it as devil worship. Unlikely as It seems, Augustine
saw In this realm of suffering a higher purpose making of it
a bad means to a good end. Under the onslaught of the devils
it became the high opportunity of the saints to show forth
their virtues and thus win the praise of Ood and man.
Another form of suffering Identified in the Augustlnlan
analysis is that which the righteous must undergo at the hands
20 Ibid., pp. 297*208.
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of their vloked enemies.61 The lose of material possessions,
of life, of virtue or any infamy poaBible of infliction by
the ungodly, ie a distinct discipline of suffering through
which the saints must go. It Is simply an Inevitable con-
sequence of the conflict between righteousness and unright
eousness. It is not without its own reward. It is a means
of the refinement of affections so that the Christian may be
sure his heart is set on things above. Furthermore, there
are reasons for this kind of suffering yet unknown to us.
These reasons are hidden in the secret judgment of God and may
only be revealed at the lf.pt great Judgment. 82 Above all It
is to be noted that in suffering the loss of goods the saints
do net lose the true good nor do the chaste, though violently
robbed of their virginity, lose the sanctity of Innocence,
neither does that one who forfeits his life lose eternal life.5
This la to say that true beatitude is spiritual and ether*
worldly, tio temporal adversity can touch the repose of that
one who trusts the Christian's God for his ultimate happiness.
Obviously, the consummation of history is extra-historical,
outside the natural limits of time as men know It. That for
which the race quests can not be found in the here and now.
21 Ibid., pp. 12-54.
22 Ibid. , pp. 32*34.
23 Ibid., pp. 15 ff .
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The foregoing is the general scheme of Augustine's
insight to suffering as a constituent of historic processes.
He had more to say about the detail of suffering but there
was nothing more regarding the meaning or consequence of suf
fering. It Is evident that this is not to he equated with a
comprehensive doctrine of the curse. Indeed, throughout his
writings, there is no systematic and thorough treatment of
the doctrine. He did not begin with It as a divine purpose
and follow its efficiency in history to the culmination of
things. Rather he noticed it only as an incidental of man's
life in an adverse world. In reality the validity of Augus
tine's remarks upon suffering was only second-hand. Augustine,
being s Christian, was confronted with the doctrine of the
Fall and a consequential curse. Augustine accepted this tra
ditional element of the faith. It is only natural, therefore,
to Interpret pertinent sections of his writings as equivalent
to his concept of the curse, nevertheless the concept is not
developed.
III. EVALOATIOI
In retrospect what had Augustine achieved? (Of course
in evaluating Augustine the criticism extends only to the pro
per limits of the Interests of this paper. Thi- has not been
a critique of the Augustlnlan historiography but only of that
fragment dealing with the curse as an historical constituent.)
17
There ware several major weaknesses in Augustine whioh exten
sively modified his insight into the curse.
First, as Pope has shown, though Augustine was actual
ly something of a naturalist his method was altogether un
scientific. He was handicapped by the naivete of his time
with its notable lack of inductive, first-hand research.
This weakness was illustrated by an exchange between Augustine
and Julian the Pelagian.24 Augustine had insisted that since
the pangs of birth were a punishment for man's sin they were
therefore experienced only by man. Julian, challenging this,
claimed the cries of animals in bearing as contrary evidence.
The thing of interest is that Augustine attempted no experi
mental Investigation of the matter but simply rejected a pri
ori the olaim of contrary evldenoe. Obviously he fell into
error. This weakness runs through all his work. He was not
scholar enough to discriminate between his own opinion and
objective fact. The detriment of this to his interpretation
of the curse is readily apparent for the curse is, more than
anything else, something which effects nature.
Beyond this there was a more basic fault. It was
Augustine's amazing failure to fully appreciate the governing,
shaping power of the curse. It is inconceivable that he could
24 Hugh Pope, Saint Augustine of Hippo (Westminister,
Maryland! The Hewman Prese, 1949), pp. 238-239.
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have seen It as the dynamic behind natural evil* Natural
evil was necessary to the best possible world and consequent
ly no adverse explanation, e.g. the curse, was possible. He
did not take natural adversity as seriously as the Bible would
require. This was but one way of expressing his determinism.
Natural evil was a necessity not a curse*
Moreover, he failed to notice the progressive charac
ter of the curse, how it has mounted age by age as man's in
crease in iniquity has required it. He seemed even to have
underestimated the specific pronouncements of the curse,
thus missing their true nature. This was due in part to
Augustine's habit of allegorising Soripture. He did not re
gard Eden as a literal place but merely as a typical and do-
25
sorlptive term for man's experience of Innocence. But if
Eden was not literal the exoluslon from Eden could not be
literal. Then what of that entire pronouncement of God's
wrath and punishment in setting man at odds with his environ
ment? Furthermore he treated one of the greatest incidents
of the curre, the Tower of Babel event, so lightly that he
saw nothing but the obvious.
26 He passed by one of the most
profound circumstances of all history without being aroused
to its significance.
25 Augustine, The Pity of God, II, 16-17.
26 Ibid., p. 98.
19
His one great accomplishment, in relation to this
study, was hia analysis of beatitude. He established the
fact that man's destiny lay In his conformity to the will of
Ood and that barriers of natural and moral evil were detri
mental to beatitude. In this sense the curse had a mildly
utilitarian purpose. Suffering was a good imposition for the
benefit of the soul's maturity and for society's purification.
This, however, is not tantamount to the Bible's portrayal of
the nature and extent of the curse.
McOlffert, Osmun, Pope, and Pryzwara concurred in
omitting from their several reviews of Augustine any mention
of what might be called a dialectic of history.27 They find
his lasting significance to be in other are s. Even Barrow's
analysis of The City of Ood did not conclude with anything
more than a collection of generalisations about history and
there was nothing in Barrow's review which would so much as
suggest a doctrine of the curse.28
Augustine recognized that humanity was plagued by man
ifold torments of body, mind and soul. He knew that man's
life was not complete in time. He realized that his destiny,
87 Arthur McOlffert, A History of Christian Thought
(Hew York: Charles Scrlbnera-Sons, 1946*7 5 0. W. Osmun ,
Angus tine t The Thinker (lew York: Eston and Mains, 1906))
Pope, opT olt�; Brlok Pryzwara. An Augustine Synthesis
(London i Sheed and Ward, 1959).
"~~
26 Barrow, cp_. clt.
20
the fulfillment of life, lay beyond the mundane In eternity.
Furthermore, Augustine saw that man's discomfort led him to
reach out beyond himself in the perennial attempt to find
lasting peaoe. And he discerned the great distinction pre
vailing between those who rightly and those who wrongly
sought for security. All of this sums up in his recognition
that the heavenly and earthly cities are so intermingled as
go
to be inseparable. This mixed condition is at once the
occasion for pain to the saint and pleasure to the sinner.
Their common lot necessarily involves each of them in the
other's fortune or misfortune. Only In eternity will the
cities be distinct. This is a monumental insight to the
complexity of history. And had Auguetine but realized the
significance of Paradise as an historically valid assertion
about man's origin and nature it would undoubtedly have modi
fied the whole development of Christian thought. But he re
jected Paradise except allegoric* lly and lost the keenness of
the impact of the curse upon history. Mature, for Augustine,
had always involved the base as well as the lofty. It was
part of the original. In this failure to square his thinking
with the literal biblical account of man and the world Augus
tine forfeited the opportunity to set forth a long Ignored
treasure of Christian doctrine.
29 Augustine, The 01 ty of Ood. Book 19.
CHAPTER III
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OP AQUINAS
I. THE THOMISTIC SYNTHESIS
Just as Augustine was inclined to follow Plato so
Aquinas modeled his thought after Aristotle. That fact bears
significantly upon his view of history. Quatafson has point
ed out a very far reaching distinction. He has shown that
whereas for Plato the good was the most fundamental reality.
for Aristotle it was being.1 Plato defined being in terms
of the good but Aristotle defined the good in terms of being.
Aquinas was faithful to The Philosopher in this respect end
consequently regarded the good as only a mode of being. This.
likewise, was a departure from Augustine. Both Augustine and
Aquinas described man as a creature of beatitude but beatitude
must be understood in relation to these alternate categories.
Augustine thought of man's life as a greater or lesser approxi
mation of the divine idea of man and regarded his being as the
more real as this approximation was the more perfect. But
Aquinas conceived of man's being as containing within itself
the model of its own destiny. It is reminiscent of the
1 Gustuf J. Oustafeon, The Theory of Natural Appetency
in the Philosophy of St. Thomas" iVfasninRton . D. C . ; The
TJathollo University of Americ Press, 1944), p. 59.
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Aristotelian enteleohy. For Augustine the goal of beatitude
was objective to man but for Aquinas it was of man's very
constitution, subjective or internal. Therefore in Aquinas
there Is a dynamism not found in Augustine. It is the dyna
mism of apxetency.8 (of course this is not to be confused
with the dynamism of becoming characteristic of later philo
sophical systems.) Yet, though Aquinaa favors Aristotle in
the instance just cited, there is another In which he decides
for Piste* It has to do with the Pis tonic doctrine of ideas.
In this Aquinas was following the lead of St. Bonaventure
whose argument 01 Ison has succinctly expressed.
According to this doctor, the fundamental error of
Aristotle consists in his rejection of the Platonic doc
trine of ideas. Since, according to Aristotle, Ood does
not possess in Himself, like so many models, the Ideas of
all things, It follows that Ood knows only Himself and Is
ignorant of the particular. From this first error springs
the second, namely that Ood, ignorant of all tilinga , pos
sesses no prescience and exercises no providence in regard
to things. But if Ood exercises no providence, it follows
that everything happens either by aocidont or by necessity
of fate. And as events cannot be the result of a simple
accident, the Arabs concluded that everything is neces
sarily determined by the movement of the spheres, viz.
by the Intelligences which move them. Such a conception
obviously annuls the disposition of events of this world
with a view to the punishment of sinners and the glory of
the elect. Henoe we find that Aristotle never mentions
either the devil or the future beatitude. The error is
therefore threefold, namely s failure to understand first,
exemplarlsm, then Divine providence end Istlv the disposi
tion of this worlvi with a view to the other.5
2 "tbjd., p. 52.
5 Entlenne Oilson, The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas
(St. Louis, Mori B. Herder Book Go., 1941), pp. 14,15.
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Even a cursory reading of Aquinas is evidence of the extent
to which he eorreota the threefold error. Exemplarism,
providence and the proper end of all things do indeed make
up a very large part of the Thomiatic discussion.
These foregoing elements, the Aristotelian concept of
being and the Platonic dootrine of ideas, comprise the extra-
Christian content of the Thomistic philosophy as it is con
cerned with history. And to this must Oe ad ied the moral
view of history. Aquinas, like his predecessor Augustine,
saw history as the stage of a great conflict between the
foroes of good and evil. All history was divisible, along
this line, into two camps, the righteous and the wicked.
Sheen has described this as the continuous view of history.*
It is a useful description even though it does not go far
toward definition for it serves to emphasize the contrast
between the Thomistic ooncept of civilization and certain
discontinuous views such as that of Toynbee and Marx. His
tory, according to Aquinas, does not move by leaps or by cut
ting itself off from the past for the sake of alignment with
the future. History is continuous in that the life of the
Ohurch is unbroken. Its origin and destiny are in Ood and
there is no interrupting hiatus. The meaning and purpose,
the fullfillment of history, is fully comprehended in its
4 Fulton J. Sheen, Philosophy of Religion (flew York:
Random House, 1945), p. 323.
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moral program*
Thus far the Ingredients of the Thomistic synthesis,
Plato !s doctrine of ideas, Aristotle's concept of being and
Augustine's insight to the moral nature of history, hare been
listed. The application of this synthesis for a philosophy
of history is expressed in the Thomistic discuselon of provi
dence.
Two things belong to providence�namely, the exemplar
of the order of things foreordained towards an end, and
the execution of this order, which is called government.
As regards the first of these, Sod has Immediate provi
dence over everything, even the smallest, and whatever
causes Be assigns to certain effects. Be gives them the
power to produce those affects. Whence it must be that
He has pre-comprehended the order of these effects in
His mind. As to the second there are certain intermedi
aries of Ood* a providence, for He governs things inferior
by superior, not by any defect of His power, but by rea
son of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity
of causality is imparted even to creatures.
Thus did Aquinas apply the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Along
side it, or within it, he plaoed the Aristotelian concept of
being.
The natural necessity of things to their goal Is, indeed,
like the necessity which directs an arrow to its markt
Juat as the flight of the arrow bears the stamp of the
archer, so this natural necessity is an impression put
on things by Ood. But there is this important difference
that the archer does violence to the arrow which if it
self is voider no natural necessity to seek this target
rather than anothr, but what things receive from Ood
is not an impetus contravening nature, rather it is
5 Anton Pegls, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas
(Mew York : Random House, 1045), p. 25*57
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nature itself.0
Mature i� internal. The teleologieal goal is intrinsic, not
extrinsic. Therefore, because the end of things exists not
only within then as directing forma but in the divine mind as
well, history is the outworking of Qod'e purpose both by natu
ral law and special providence. This in general is the opera
tional chart of history.
II. THE STATE OP MAM
All that can be known of the Angelic Doctor's opinion
of the curse is by inference. He does not treat it as a dis
tinct topic. Throughout his observations regarding man's
fallen and pre-falien states there are, however, various clear
statements suggestive of a consistent judgment in the matter.
Above all, man's state is one of affluence due to divine be
neficence. In the beginning Ood could have created man mere
ly In the natural order yet in fact He created him in the
supernatural ordrrj following Adam's sin Ood oculd have left
man In s hopeless stste but instead he offered him the privi
lege of grace,7 Ibis optimism prevails in all he has to say
of men. It is evidence of what modern exponents of the perennial
6 Oustsfson, op. clt. . p. OS.
7 Reginald Oarrlgou-Lagrange, The One Ood (St. Louis,
Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1943), p. 622.
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a
philosophy have designated "true humanism". True humanism
Is to be understood in contrast to an thropocen trie humanism,
naturalism* The distinction is an effort to point up the
positive but orthodox scholastic doe trine of man in contrast
to the self-centered humanism of the Renaissance and to il
lustrate the danger of divesting anthropology of Its Ood-ward
orientation. Obviously the mood of this doctrine, In spite
of its Christian connotations, does not readily admit of the
negativism of the curse*
Aquinas has inquired whether there would have been in
equality among men in the state of innocence* And he has re-
Q
turned an affirmative judgment. He believed the diversity
of sex necessitated inequality. He saw free choice as the
ground of inequality. Likewise there was bodily disparity
due to environmental factors. The relevance of this fore
going observation is that Inequality, having been ingrained
in man's original constitution, need not be explained as
something subsequently imposed as a punishment.
furthermore Aquinas turned his attention to the rela
tion of man to the lower animals. He agreed that man was the
master of Paradise including ooimrand over animals.10 However,
8 Jacques Marl tain, True Humanism (London: The Century
press, 1938), pp. 18-19.
*"^"""
9 Peg!8, 0�. cit.. pp. 920-921.
10 Lqc. pit.
27
ho departed from tradition in thinking that ferocity among
the animals themselves was original in them. It was not, he
thought, s consequence of Judgment upon the natural order
for man's default. Man's nature alone was altered by sin.
In Paradise he was not dependent upon animals for food, or
clothing, or transportation for all his needs were directly
supplied to him.11 Aquinas did not believe that hostility
among animals was a distortion of nature. Rather he stressed
that sin affected man's loss of mastery over them.
Even man's loss of supremacy was no evldenoe of a
great principle of adversity administered by Ood in nature
for man's eventual recovery. It was simply the defection of
man's original constitution without any teleological design.
It was a consequence void of great purpose. Sin broke the
"...bond of original justice, which held together all the
powers of the soul in a certain order... "*2j thus, man in
clined to disintegration and inner conflict. Han had origi
nally stood on the promontory of creation. He sinned and
fell. The effect of his fall was mere negation of what had
obtained before. It was the defection of but a segment of
the world-order and not an infection of the whole. It evi
denced nothing of a complex interdependency within the cosmos.
11 Ibid., p. 919.
12 Ibid., p. 678.
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It was as though only a heavenly body had fallen and not that
the law of gravity itself had been revised.
III. EVALUATION
The curse was no more than simple punishment In the
Judgment of Aquinas. Having violated the laws of his own
nature and having incurred divine wrath man could not expect
to avoid suffering.15 But this suffering was arbitrary, not
teleologloal. It touohed only the surface of life. It did
not upset the essential constitution of things. Rather than
a mojor factor in diflnlng the relation of man to the universe
the curse was but a penalty depriving man of complete happi
ness. It was not a universal law of the cosmos but an iso
lated condition applying to man's limited plaoe in the world.
The ourse did not contribute significantly to the
course of history. Aquinas held to the racial theory of de
pravity but this is not equivalent to a theory of the curse
working Its effect upon civilization.14 The Thomistic view
has not sought to explain the nature and process of civili
zations as being in any way the effect of the curse.
13 Ibl(U � II t 701-700.
14 Ibld�* PP. 664-667.
CHAPTER IV
CALVIN'S INSIGHT
I. HIS INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE
It would be too much to say that Calvin had no philo
sophical bias, for he did. But he can not be precisely lo
cated In reference to the full range of philosophical problems.
He was a Christian humanist and a determ nist but to say even
this much by way of locating him is already to have inserted
antithetical elements into the definition of Calvin's thought.
Humanism, though the forerunner of Protestantism, was never
theless opposed to the ends to whloh the pro testants went in
achieving the ideals of the humanists.1 And Calvin's deter
minism was even less consistent with humanism. Yet the thing
of importance is not the antithetical but the synthetic turn
of mind which Calvin exercised. His Protestantism did not
repudiate his humanism. This was evidenced by the fact that
he "...made the Organon the foundation of Genevan philosophy."2
And it was further emphasised by his interest in Stoicism,
but this was no Index to his world-view for Stoicism was but
1 -culrinus Breen, John Calvin? A Study in French
Humanism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. 1. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1951), pp. 90-91.
8 P� 186.
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the prototype of humanism, its well-spring. Neither was a
finished and self-sufficient philosophical system. Father
humanism, in-so-far as It influenced Calvin, was more a meth
od of scholarship and an area of interest than a fundamental
philosophy. It was a movement for academic and personal
freedom from the older Institutional forms as represented
especially by the Roman Church and the secular states associ
ated with it. Consequently, it can be asserted that Calvin
did not succeed in resolving the various influences upon his
thought and life to an Irreducible principle capable of or
ganising the random stuff of his rich and 'iverse experience
into a coherent philosophy.
Even the Institutes evldenoe no controlling idea, the
plan of the work is merely an expose or scriptural defense of
the Apostle's Creed. Its method is topical and the work does
not rank as a finished scheme of thought but merely as a seg
ment capable perhaps of being fitted to a larger whole.3 Per
haps the Calvinian oonoept of the sovereignty of Cod, which
pervades the Institutes and the Commentaries as well, might
be thought of as a controlling philosophical principle. It
does Indeed define Calvin's attitude toward much of the theo
logical construot. His doctrine of man and of the atonement
3 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion.
translated by John Allen, { Philadelphia s Presbyterian Board
of Eduoation, n.d.), I, 41.
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are surely conditioned by this idea to the exclusion of any
traces of humaniwr.. But anthropology and soteriology are
not the whole of theology and to apply the Calvinian concept
of sovereignty willy-nilly to hi a entire work would be a mis
take in the case of a thinker of so varied and ecclectic a
tendency as Calvin.
In the absence, then, of a key to hi 3 view of history
the procedure of this paper has been to set forth his view
of the curse with no philosophical context. His pronounce
ments on the topic were abundant and clear. The Institutes.
save for the opening chapter of the second Book did not deal
so much with the curse as with the loss of original innocence.
This is to say that the Institutes were concerned not primari
ly with man's relation to the cosmos but with the nature of
man itself. Only in passing did they touch upon the curse4
and even then they said nothix*& which was not Improved upon
in the Comnrentarles. It was from the Commentaries that Cal
vin's view of the curse has been drawn.
II. HIS EXPOSITION OP THE CURSE
Calvin's view of Eden was thoroughly traditional. He
5
believed it to have been a distinct locality. But as to its
4 Ibid., p. 2?o.
5 John Calvin. Commentaries on the First Book of Moses
Called genesis, trans la ted by John ITng7""(Grand R"apTds7 Mich:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Go,, 1948), I, 119.
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paradisical quality he thought It was not greatly unlike the
earth generally.6 Paradise was for man's pleasure but he
was to cultivate and oare for it. "This labour, truly, was
pleasant, and full of delight, entirely exempt from all trou
ble and weariness..."7 Calvin was attracted to the idea that
man was originally content with herbs and fruits for food.
Yet the faot that the first men ssorificed animals and dress
ed in skins seemed to contradict this judgment and he was un
able to come to a decision concerning the matter.6 It would
appear that Calvin saw at least the possibility of violence
between man and beast In paradise. Nevertheless in Eden man
Q
was perfectly at peace with Ood and himself.
The incidence of the fsll disrupted man's original
innocence and a curse was pronounced upon man and his envir
onment.
For as the primum mobile italics in the original rolls
all the celestial spheres along with it, so the ruin of
man drives headlong all those creatures whioh were form
ed for his sake, and had been made subject to him. And
we see how constantly the condition of the world itself
varies with respect to men, according as Ood is angry
with them, or shows them his favour. We may add, that,
properly speaking, this whole punishment is exacted, not
from the earth itself, but from man alone. For the earth
6 Ibid. . pp. 118 ff.
7 Ibid., p. 125.
8 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
9 Ibid. . pp. 126-132.
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does not bear fruit for itself, but in order that food
may be sup; lied to us out of its bowels. The Lord, how
ever, determined that his anger should, like a deluge,
overflow all parts of the earth, that wherever man fight
look, the atrooity of his sin should meet his eyes.10
The curse was complete and very deep, so that new men see but
a shadowy copy of the earth's original beauty. Man was thrust
from the vocation of paradise, where work was play, out upon
the prospect of servile work, "...as If he hod been condemned
to the mines. 1,11 And even though the rich may seem free of
the curse yet, " . . .no one lies torpid in suoh a degree of
sloth as not to be under the necessity of experiencing that
this curse belongs to all. "12
The apparent curse upon the serpent was really no
curse at all, said Calvin. The serpent had gone beyond its
rightful bounds in being used of the devil and was merely
returned to its rightful place.13 The role of the serpent
was amoral. But Calvin went further and deduced from this
Interplay of man and beast a most remarkable thing. He
claimed that the very arrangraent of creation was such that
whenever man beheld one of the animals of paradise it should
have been a reminder to him of the authority and goodness of
10 Ibid** P. 173.
H Loc' Qit.
18 Ibid., p. 176.
13 Ibid., p. 166.
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Ood. But, "...on the contrary, when they saw the serpent an
apostate from his Creator, not only did they neglect to pun
ish It, but in violation of all lawful order, they subjected
and devoted themselves to it, as participators in the same
apostacy."1* Han, in the very act of listening to the ser
pent, subjected himself to nature and thereby surrendered
his plaoe as lord of nature J
The curse upon the woman involved her in the pains of
childbirth and made her subject to her husband.13 These ex
periences were not entirely new but whereas they had been
natural they now became injurious to woman's happiness. The
16
curse largely conditioned the relationship of maii <*ad woman.
Whereas in man's first estate the sweetest harmony prevailed
between man and wife, now the corruption of nature has almost
extinguished the happiness of marriage.
Overshadowing all other effects of the curse is the
consequence of death, Death, for man was both physical and
spiritual.17 Loss of spiritual life entailed the loss of
"...a right judgment and a proper government of the Affections
. . ."18 physical death meant the eventual separation of soul
14 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
15 Ibid., pp. �n-172.
16 Ibid., p. 130.
17 Ibid., p. 127.
18 Loo. Pit.
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and body, an unnatural experience. Even in innocence man's
life waa to have been temporal. That is he would have been
removed from the earth into heaven but not by way of death.1�
Yet the sentence of death in sinful man wag not immediately
executed. Death began gradually to rule in bin until it had
its full effect.
Until now only the personal and natural elements of
the curse have been discussed. There were social elements
as well. The curse upon Cain for the murder of Abel is an
example. By divine decree Cein was estranged from his fellow
man. This estrangement, in Calvin's judgment, was responsible
for the first city.20 It was as if he had built a fort for
protection from the revenge which his fellows might have
sought in behalf of Abel. If this is an explanation for the
beginning of city life then surely the curse is a mighty fac
tor in the oourse of human history. Moreover, Calvin noticed
that, although the curse especially followed Cain's deacen-
dents, it was with them that art began.21 Calvin Interpreted
this as a sign of God's generosity toward them, as if He
would not so cast them down as to deprive them of all gifts.
19 Loo, cit.
20 Ibid., p. 216,
21 Ibid., pp. 217-218,
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Moreover, the liberal arts and sciences have descended
to ua from the heathen. We are. Indeed, compelled to
acknowledge that we have received astronomy, and other
parts of philosophy, medicine, and the ord r of civil
government from them.22
This is all the more significant in the light of Calvin's
thorough acquaintance with heathen culture. He was one of
the first students In attendance at the University of ..ourges,
founded for the advancement of the "new learning",23 and his
intellectual climate was that of Erasmus, Bude, Valla, Alciatl,
et. al.24 Without the prompting provided by the present In
terest in history, Calvin caught a g limp a of whs t men have
waited until the opening of this century to realize: the dy
namic relation of sin and culture, but he did not elaborate
upon it.
The division of tongues at the To war of Babel is anoth
er great incident of the curae. Calvin saw the increase of
populstion as the motive for building the to >er. He believed
the participants anticipated a general dispersion due to the
overcrowding of their oountry and that the tower was their
attempt to memoralize their point of origin.25 It waB a bid
for immortal fame baaed on pride. But "...yet it cannot be
22 Ibid. . p. 218.
23 Breen, op. cit. . p. 44.
24 Ibid. . oh. II, III, VI.
28 Ibid., pp. 324 ff.
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otherwise than that everyone who transgresses his prescribed
bounds, makes a direct attack upon Ood ,"26 Consequently Ood
confounded them with the multiplicity of languages. This
was unnatural to man for it is man's nature to be social.
The unity of society was the gift of Ood. And though this
unity ought to have promoted common consent in true religion
it did not.27 On the other hand, though it is true that
the world bears this curse to the present dayt yet, in
the midst of punishment, and of the most dreadful proof
of Divine anger against the pride of men, the nations
hold mutual communication among themselves, though in
different languaguesj but especially becsuse He hss pro
claimed one gospel, in ell languages, through the whole
world, and has endued the Apostles with the gift of
tongues. Whence it hat come to pass, that they who be
fore were miserably divided, have coalesced in the unity
of the faith.28
This wee a keen observation. The Church was to be the ful
fillment of the nations. But in Calvin's analysis this Idea
was only Ii* embryo form. Nevertheless, the seeds of essential
unity in this way of thinking ere as great as any medieval
institutional unity supposedly denied by the Reformation.
Whether Calvin followed the Implications of his doctrine is
another question.
26 Ibid., p. 324.
27 Ibid., p. 326.
28 Ibid . . p. 331.
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III. OOHCL0SIOH
Calvin did not directly relate the curse to the pro
blem of history for history, after all, was not a vivid con
cern to him. His understanding of the curse, however, bore
respect In an age of speoial historical interest for it was
provocative of certain moods of thought only lately initiated.
The two things outstanding in his grasp of the matter were
(1) that he realised how extensively the curse modified man's
relationship to nature and (S) that he saw the curse, not
only as a divine decree expressing Cod's wrath, but as an in
evitable or natural consequence of sin. He went to an extreme
in this second idea. He believed the universe would have dis
integrated after man's defection except for the sustaining
power of Ood.2� He missed the teleo logical nature of the
curse. But his achlevment goes well beyond that of Augustine
or Aquinas.
29 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
CHAPTER V
EDWARD �S ANALYSIS
X. IMPLICATIONS OF DETERMINISM
History was a major concern with Edwards, His contri
bution to the subject of this study has been, however, rather
brief, What he h d to say of the curse was indeed limited.
Were it not that the deterministic tradition reached in
Edwards a most exact expression in relation to historiography
his work would not be noticed here, Edwards saw history as
the panorama of Cod's redemptive effort,1 Ood was the Sover
eign of history. And history's course was governed solely
by His design to establish the Church in the world upon the
merits of Christ, her Lord snd Savior. Consequently Edwards
regarded history as a series of divine acts or dispensations.
It was sacred, i.e. human history was fully comprehended In
Bible history, There were three significant periods: (1) from
the incarnation till the resurrection, and (3) from the recur-
2
rection till the end of the world.
IX. HIS DOCTRINE OF THE CURSE
Edwards held to the traditional Interpretation of man's
1 Jonathan Edwards, A History of the Work of Redemption
(Hew York: Shepard Kollock,~*1786 ), p."~61.
2 P� 39.
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earliest state as one of innocence and blessedness which
state was interrupted and destroyed by the fall.3 Only the
forbearance of Ood kept man from destruction4 and the uni
verse from chaos.5 Thus Edwards agreed with Calvin in think
ing of the curse as a natural consequence of sin. He also
reoognlzed it as a divine decree.6 His elaboration of the
curse was as follows:
Han's soul was ruined by the fall; the i age of Ood
was ruined; man's nature was corrupted and destroyed,
and man became dead in sin.. .Han's body was ruined; by
the fall It became subject to death.. .The world was ruin
ed, as to man, as effectually as if it had been returned
to chaos again; all heaven and earth were overthrown.7
III. SUMMARY
Obviously the curse, for Edwards, was an important
historic factor but not a dynamic or controlling force. He
did not think of history as subjeot to the Interplay of po
tent societal factors. The course of history was entirely
arbitrary.
3 Ibid., p. 45.
4 Ibid., p. 42.
5 Ibid., p. 37.
6 Ibid., p. 46.
7 Ibid., p. 37.
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Indeed Ood oould have taken oth< r methods to deliver
his ohurch : he oould have oonverted all the world instead
of drowning it; and so he oould have taken another method
than drowning the Egyptians in the Red Sea. But that is
no argument, that the method that he did take, was not a
method to show his redeeming meroy to them.6
Edwards was not in search of some pervasive sociological
principle that might explain the rise and fall of nations.
The destiny of the nations was in the hands of Ood and no
reason antecedent to His will was needed in explaining his
torical events. There was nothing binding upon Ood, i.e. no
fixed framework of history, which required that He treat man
one way rather than another. History was entirely at His
disposal. The over-ruling principle governing Ood's inter
vention in history was His purpose of Redemption. The dis
persion at the tower of Babel was In accord with this. The
nations were not simply scattered at random. They were dis
tributed with reference to Palestine so that with the announce
ment of the gospel they might hear of redemption.� The devil,
knowing of this intent, drew as many of the nations as he could
attraot to distant parts of the earth; this is how America came
to be inhabited.1�
Edwards, as previously indicated, only touched upon the
8 Ibid. . p. 63.
0 Ibid., p. 68.
10 Loo, cit.
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topic of the curse. What he did say, by way of analyzing
the curse, is not of great importance. But one must not con-
elude that the Edwardian historiography is not important to
the question of evangelical protestantism's concept of the
relation of the curse to the course of history. It is Edwards
perhaps who has given evangelical protestantism its most ex
plicit analysis of history and the fact that the curse found
no significant place in his thought is of unusual importance.
In Edwards the Augustlnlan tradition reaches its logical
conclusion* If all history is predetermined and providential
ly controlled so as to invariably demonstrate the mercy and
glory of Ood then no special cause for the particular effects
of history need by sought. An independent sociological prin
ciple such as the curse would appear to Edwards as entirely
Irrelevant, In this he surely went beyond Augustine and
Calvin, Augur tine realized that once creation had been begun
certain necessary relationships must be maintained within the
universe. There was prognostic value in Augustine's analysis.
The rise and fall of nations wa.s in accord with established
principles of man's beatitude. Any nation deviating from the
plan risked destruction. Ood arbitrarily chose these prin
ciples of beatitude but once chosen they constituted the moral
law upon which history was grounded,
Calvin did not apply his idea of the curse to histori
ography but the societal implications of his conception of
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the curse are so explicit that their relevance to the prob
lem cannot be missed. The curse was a factor working in
history. It was the curse which d< Beribed the difference
between man's paradisical and present state. It accounted
for the minutia of personal suffering and for the magnitude
of national catastrophe�even for the barrier of national
identities*
All this Is contradictory to the conclusion of Edwards.
It is an oddity of the progress of thought that one so faith
ful to the tradition of Augustine and Calvin should have so
thoroughly modified their teaching at this point. But it is
only the logical result of their determinism. Independent
principles at work in history are extraneous to the very nat
ure of the case if Ood is sovereignly, arbitrarily directing
history. Edwards aocounted for history, the course and des
tiny of civilizations, without referring to the dynamic,
shaping quality of the curse. In support of this conclusion
Is the fact that a later determinist, Lewis S. Chafer, has
not referred to the curse even once in the remarkable dis
cussion of civilization contained in his Systematic Theology.1*
11 Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology (Dallas,
Texas: Dallas Seminary Press, 194*/), II, dh. VII.
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Neither does the curse appear In hia catalogue of 312 doc-
trines though the list seems very exhaustive indeed.
&
Evidently Edwards was moving with the trend of his tradition
and gave suitable expression to its logical consequence*
12 Ibid., VIII, 61-63.
CHAPTER VI
NIEBUHR �S INSIGHT
1. OPTIMISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY
A very greet part of Niebuhr's effort la devoted to
the exposition and criticism of optimistic historiography.
It is against the backdrop of optimism that this realism is
to be understood. The contrast between these opposites,
optimism and realism, runs through all his work. He has
traced the course of optimism from the Greeks to the present.
showing its limitations and failures in affording man an under
standing of himself and his destiny.1 "The dominant note in
modern culture is not so much confidence in reason as faith
in history.*12 Implicated in this mistake are the most diverse
trsdltiona. Leibnitz, the rationalist; Herd r, the romanti
cist; Kant, the critical idealist; Hegel, the idealist; J. S.
Mill, the utilitarian; Comte, the posltivlst; Spencer, the
determlnlst; Dewey, the pragma tiat; and Marx, the materialist,
shsre alike in the notion that the future is the ideal ful
fillment of the present,3 But It is Niebuhr �s strong conviction
1 Reinhold Hiebuhr, Faith and History (How York:
Charles Scribner 's Soss, 1949), pp. 14-15.
8 Ibid., p. 5.
3 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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that regardless of optimism's impressive history it is never
theless unfounded.
There were experiences in previous centuries which
might have challenged this unqualified optimism. But
the expansion of man's power over nature proceeded at
such a pace that all doubts were quieted, allowing the
nineteenth century to beoorae the "eentury of hope" and
to express the modern mood in its most extravagant
terms. History, refusing to live by the calendar,
actually permitted the nineteenth century to indulge
its illusions into the twentieth. Then came the del
uge**
An unprejudiced study of history, and especially recent his
tory, cannot but undermine confidence in history as its own
fulfillment. Of course the possibilities of achievement are
always ju'-t great enough to permit the survival of the false
hope that "...tomorrow will finally solve., .the insoluble
problems of history."5 But even so the deepest probing of
history requires the conclusion that frustration is insepa-
rable from human history.0
II. REAL! -TIC HISTORIOGRAPHY
Man's Freedom. Nlebuhr, in rejecting optimism, has
not embraced pessimism. Like the optimist, he affirms the
oapaoity of man for meaningful adjustment to nature. (Man's
4 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
6 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Discerning the Signs of the Times
(New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1946), p. 85,
6 Loo, cit.
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"��.essence is free self-determination," )7 Rather his count
er-claim Is realism. Mary Pr&ncls Thelen h?s dealt at length
with the matter of Hiebuhr � s relation to the older liberal
theology and has drawn the same conclusion.8 The thing of
importance is that, in his reaction against the myriad forms
of optimism, Hiebuhr does not fail to understand the validity
of their claim as to man's height of freedom.
The extension of the human powers Is the basis of
the progressive character of human history. Every new
conquest of nature and every new elaboration of human
�kills means that human actions and responsibilities
are set in the context of a wider field. This Is the
creative side of human history.^
Through his freedom man is released from the category of nat
ure. He transcends the natural order and is thus differenti
ated from the lower animals. He is in the image of Ood.
Carnell agrees with Hiebuhr that without the power of self-
transcendence there would be no qualitative difference be
tween past and present, that whereas
the brute is submerged in the herd or the flock, deposit
ing for history neither loss nor gain, man leaves behind
a chain of cultural monuments which in turn serve as the
7 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Human Mature (Hew York: Charles
Soribner's Sons, 1946), p. 16.
8 Hary Francis Thelen, Man as Sinner (Morningslde
Heights, Hew York: King's Crown Press, 1946), pp, 87 ff ,
9 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Discerning the Signs of the Times
pp. 64-66.
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foundation of the next generation of men.10
Man's freedom, this semi-remote relation to the cosmos, gives
him unique perspective without which he would have neither a
significant time-sense nor an understanding of process.
These are prerequisite to organization, control and purpose.
This is to say that man's freedom is the ground of history.
Man I s involvement. Realism insists that though man
is free to range about over nature he is nevertheless moored
to nature. He is not completely free. The Niebuhrian an
thropology is briefly exhausted in the following expression:
"...man Is a child of nature...man is a spirit who standi
outside of nature..,"11 These are the two antithetical but
irrefutable facts about man. Nlebuhr seldom writes a page
without stressing the antagonism of these elemental features
of human experience. It is the recognition of this double
reference in man's nature, transcendence and involvement.
which distinguish Christianity from all other anthropological
concepts.1^
Carnell has given a summary of Nlebuhr' s manifold
objections to the non-Carls tian anthropological dominants of
10 Edward J, Carnell, The Theology of Relnhold Miebuhr
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: W�. B. Eerdmana Publishing Co . , 1951), eh. 3.
11 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Human Mature p. 5.
12 Ibid., pp. 12-18.
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Western civilization {classical Idealism, naturalism and ro
manticism) which demonstrates the relation of Nlebuhr' s
realistic anthropology to his philosophy of history. (1)
Classical idealism negleoted the physical nature of man In
order to emphasize his spiritual or rational nature. Man
was continuous with the gods but discontinuous with nature.
The result was an other-worldliness which denied the impor
tance of time In st easing the reslity of eternity. History
became a aeries of meaningless cycles.^ (2) Naturalism so
identified man with nature th t it lost sight of the eternal
relations of man. But human potentialities could never be
defined apart from man's true norm which, of course, is in
eternity. History became self-sufficient and self-explana-
14
tory. (3) Romanticism sought to overcome the abasement of
man in naturalism and the deification of man in idealism but
in doing so lost sight of man as a true individual. Man was
understood in terms of the ". . .nonrational vitalities, such
as emotion, feeling and will..." But when "...the romantic
mind is divorced from eternity an autonomous individual re
sults." History became a whimsical display of vitalism} it
was llfe-in toxica tod and void of a_ real goal.*0
13 Carnell, cp. cit. . pp. 46-49.
14 Ibid. . pp. 49-52,
16 Ibid. , pp. 52-53.
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In eaoh of the foregoing systems there is en over
estimate upon either man's freedom or involvement. Conse
quently none of these has a proper understanding of history,
for history Is what Involved man does in his freedom. Only
orthodox Christianity, orthodoxy as defined by Nlebuhr, has
avoided emphasizing one side of man's nature to the neglect
of the other. It has seen him in his true freedom and true
relation to nature. Therefore, it alone has found true mean
ing in history without the extreme of making history equiva
lent to eternity.
Consequences of freedom versus Involvement. The fruit
of his Insight to the nature of man is the subject of Nlebuhr 's
life work. His writings are a landmark In the philosophy of
history. A complete exposition of all he has had to say on
this preeise tor�lo during the past quarter of a century would
obviously exceed the proper limits of this paper. But the
salient features of what he has called the "theology of his
tory* have been reviewed in order to � rovide a means of com
paring his historiography with inferences drawn from the views
of those traditional theologians presented in the earlier chap
ters of this study.
Carnell believes the
controlling insight in all of Niebhuhr's thinking is,
that, while history has the seeds of infinite progress
in it, a cross section of history at any point will
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r�v�al the sullying forces of sin.16
Nlebuhr himself declares the
most obvious meaning of history is that every nation.
culture and civilization brings destruction upon itself
by exceeding the bounds of oreatureliness which God
has set upon all human enterprises.*"
Man, in defiance of his Insecurity and insignificance in the
over-all scheme of things, seeks unqualified security and
significance.*� However effective man may be In overcoming
his contingency his success is never complete. Throughout
history every new freedom has represented "...a new peril as
well as a new promise.**� While man's triumph over nature
mounts, the risk of frustration Increases. Human experience,
for all its achievements, remains inconclusive. It implies
and reaches out for more than It can ever attain by its own
strength.80 There is no enlargement of human progress with
out a corresponding increase of human failure. Though life
points to perfection It is doomed to imperfection.
16 Ibid., p. 103.
17 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Beyond Tragedy (Hew York: Charles
Seribner'a Sons, 1937), p. 140.
18 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Human Mature p. 198.
19 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Paj^th and History p. 7.
20 Ibid., p. 126.
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Upon the ground of his psychology of human experience,
success-failure ambivalence. Nlebuhr has come to some rather
definite conclusions as to the whence and whither of civili
sation. Two very explicit pronouncements are that both poli
ties and religion are the product of man's predicament of
freedom and involvement. Furthermore he seems to indicate
that all we know as civilization la the outcome of this fun-
damenta1 problem.
On the one hand the "...most basic need of the human
spirit is the need for security and the most fundamental
problem of religion is the problem of meeting this need. "21
On the other hand the "essential homelessness of the human
spirit is the ground of all religion... "22 The most con
servative estimate of this foregoing claim is that Nlebuhr
considers that without man's peculiar predicament he would
have no spiritual experience.
Even more exceptional is Nlebuhr *s belief that all
political interest can be traced to religion.
The political history of man begins with tribal poly
theism, can be traced to through the religious preten
sions of empires with their Inevitable coneommi tants
of Imperial religions and their priest-kings and god-
kings and ends with the immoderate and idolatrous claims
21 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Beyond Tragedy p. 05.
22 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Human Nature p. 192.
of the modern fasclet state.^
If religion is the consequence of man's special predicament
and political life is traceable to religion then it is evi
dent that political life derives ultimately from the same
source. Essentially, both political activity and religion
are "spiritual manifestations of egotism" �2* They are out
croppings of the instinct for survival. Collectivism, wheth
er it takes a religious or political form, is, in Nlebuhr 'a
estimation, an expression of man's desire to sever the bonds
which hold him to the natural order.
Without religion and politics civilization would be
changed beyond recognition. It is debatable whether there
could be any such thing as civilization without these histor
ic constituents of society* But for Hiebuhr this is not a
real problem. Fundamentally, the whole scope of society
comes under the dynamic influence of humanity's estrangement
from nature.25 In order to overcome the tensions growing out
of man's experience of contingency he turns to collectivism
for relief from the discordant elements of his experience.
But civilization will always be inordinate in its aims, for
23 Ibid. . p. 211.
24 Loc. cit.
26 Loo, cit.
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It can never out-run its own insecurity. The most basic in
security is the fear of death. Every human self-assertion,
individual or collective, is the pretense to the right of
survival�the survival of its own Identity and interests.26
This is the source of all societal activity. Involvement is
the fountain-head of civilization.
Thus the dialectic is complete. It has been noted
(of. ante pp. 47-48) that without freedom there would be no
significance between part and present. There would be no
history. In addition without Insecurity there would be no
societal effort, no civilization. Freedom and involvement
combine to produce meaningful and collective living� the
history and civilization of the race.
The curse. The first item in any discussion of the
doctrinal content of Niebuhr's theology Is the discernment
of the Inconsistency with which he approaches Scripture. He
regards the Bible as true yet mythical and not as the lord
of Ood in the traditional rense. Though a full exposition of
his view of Sorlpture is not in accord with the scope of this
study it has been noted that Hiebuhr's apparent faith in the
Genesis account of man's origin is a pseudo faith. His use
of Biblical doctrines merely reflects his persuasion that the
26 !���
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Scripture, though not authentically a divine revelation, por
trays the deepest truth about man. His is a motif theology.
It 1b self-evident that one subscribing to the above
view of Scripture would be under no logical obligation to in
clude within his own system any more of the Biblical account
than suited his chosen purpose . Consequently Hiebuhr arbi
trarily appropriates what is useful to him and lightly ignores
the rest. Therefore only a fragment of the curse comes under
the scope of hi? discussion. His most significant reference
is to the Tower of Babel and in his writing it usually appears
in couplet form with the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil. Hiebuhr sees these as complementary ideas.
The "knowledge of good and evil" is a necessary expression
of the final "freedom of the human spirit" and the build
ing of towers "whose top may reach into heaven" is a nec
essary expression of the human skill which has raised man
from complete dependence upon nature to relative mastery
of nature.2�
The Tree and the Tower signify the freedom and strength of
civilization. Every civilization has its towers. Man is not
content with his confinement within a particular culture.
"Thus roan builds towers of the spirit from which he may survey
larger horizons than those of his class, race and nation."28
But these towers become Towers of Babel when they pretend to
27 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Discerning the Signs of the Times
88 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Beyond Tragedy pp. 28-29
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finality, of course there Is no finality in any one culture?
the pretense can only end in shattering destruction. The
rythieal Tower signifies that nan ,f...Is not content to be
merely American nan, or Chinese man, or bourgeois mar, or man
of the twentieth century. He wants to be man."30
Nlebuhr' e exposition of the meaning of the Tower of
Babel depart* from orthodoxy in denying that It accounts for
the diversity of languages.
The peoples of the earth never had one language. . .But it
is true that the diversity of languages is a perpetual
reminder to proud wen t&st their most perfect temples of
the spirit are touched by finlteness. Multiplicity of
languages Is the mo< t vivid symbol of the fact that the
highest pinnaoles of the human spirit lie grounded in
contingencies of nature and history.3*
This obstacle, the diversity of tongues, is the object of one
of rationalism* s fondest dreams. Si universal language.32
Obviously, in Nlebuhr �e opinion it can never be achieved.
Man is doomed to the provincialism of his native tongue.
Just as there was never a time when unity of language
prevailed In the earth so there was never a state of paradise
in which man was innocent of sin.33 Man is capable of con
ceiving of paradise, "perfectly disinterested Justice." But
30 J*2�� clt�
31 Ibid., p. 42.
32 Ibid., p. 44.
33 Ibid., p. 11.
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say attempt to realise such a goal inevitably falls short of
the object. In reality the perfection before the fall is
"...perfection before the act. "34 (Thin irj sunpinloualy
reminiseent of the Thomistic idea of deprivation, the non-
eonsideration of the divine rule In the moment of the act,}
And logically If there was never a paradise there was never
a fall�35 Then, of course, it is absurd to regard the ac
cursed state in which man is found as constituting the re
sult of a divine Judgment or the natural breakdown of the
eosraos under the Impact of sin. The doctrine of the curse
is no more than a convenient way of expressing man's relation
to nature.
Even though Hiebuhr admits that man's limitation Is
not altogether explained by his proximity to the natural
order he does not account for it as a special work of prov
idence,36 He acknowledges the peculiar ordeal of man in
bringing forth their young� that it bears little similarity
to the birth-experience of the lower animals, these bf�Ing
"free from pain". But even so it is not an instance of God's
judgment upon sin. Instead It is "...related to man's unique
ness in the animal world� the size of the human infant's head
34 Loo, cit.
36 Loo, cit.
38 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Discerning the Signs of the Times
p. 41.
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for Instance. 1,57 This way of accounting for man's experience
of limitation is an attempt at an impossible middle course
between naturalism and supernaturalism.
III. EVALUATION
Compressed to the Irreducible, a resume of Nlebuhr 's
thought stands in the following sequence: (1) man is free.
(2) man is involved, (3) man is a sinner through pretense to
finality, and (4) his sin is overcome only beyond history in
Clod's sovereignty. Nlebuhr shares the first point In this
outline with both conservatism and liberalism. In subscrib
ing to points two and three he lays claim to a special affini
ty with conservatism. But in point four he betrays himself
as being in ultimate agreement with liberalism. His faith is
that Ood will redeem history. Carnell Judiciously observes
that Nlebuhr. having rejected "...the optimism that Ood will
solve our problems through an immanent movement of the king
dom within history..." has embraced "...the optimism that Cod
will solve our problems through a transcendent movement in
eternity. "38 The outcome of Nlebuhr 's theology, for all its
sounding of doom, is assuredly universalism. This fact tends
to blunt the edge of much that he has said. But one undiminished
37 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
38 Carnell, op., cit. p. 201.
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deposit in the theological account is Nlebuhr 's insight to
the dynamic creativity of the tension stemming from man's
freedom versus involvement. He does not equate his innovation
with the dootrlne of the curse, yet the equivalence is there*
Why he has not borrowed the doctrine of the curse as he has
other doctrines is not clear.
Yet in spite of the values of Nlebuhr's historiography
there are serious weaknesses. The greatest of these is his
way of accounting for the tension permeating human experience.
Man's kinship with the animals, his lot as part of the great
natural order around him, suffices to thwart man's freedom*
But in reality why should man's involvement in nature frustrate
man's spirit? If nature were smooth and regular is it not
conceivable that freedom would not run afoul of it? There is
no reason why the orderly course of nature should not be the
ground of progressive and satisfying human achievement.
Nlebuhr ignores the insistence of orthodoxy that there is
something unnatural about nature. Nlebuhr *s concept of ten
sion follow-? the mood, if not the form, of evolution in
claiming that man's predicament is due to the misfortune of
having his feet in the mire of animality. This is not the
Christian world-view. Orthodoxy avers not only that Ood
created the world but that it was good. The cosmos was to be
the scene of man's perfect lordship.
k further aberration in Nlebuhr (in reality it grows
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out of the above fault) la hla denial that death is the con
sequence of sin. He would invert title sin-death relationship*
It is his claim that death is the greatest of all contingen
cies and, therefore, the most acute source of embarrassment
to man's freedom* 89 Because of insecurity, of which death
is the most crucial example, man la a sinner* He does not
die because he has sinned but sins because of dying. Death
la natural to man an^ it would be no problem to him if he
were not free* Were it not for his freedom to revolt against
the prospect of death he would face it ll'<e the animals, with
out fear.*0 But he is free yet bound to die and, therefore,
he inevitably sins. The distance of this concept from the
orthodox way of thinking of sin and death is a fair measure of
Nlebuhr's departure from real Christianity. Christianity de
clares that death is unnatural, that it is the consequence of
sin and that it Is a judgment from Ood. Sin made its appear
ance before death when man was both free and perfectly se
cure.
Moreover, the NlebuhrIan historiography does not un
ravel the problem to which the philosophy of history must
submit a final answer. It does not account for the nature
of every civilization. Nlebuhr says, "The most obvious meaning
59 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Human Na ture pp. 178-177.
40 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Discerning the Slyjns of the Times
p. 41.
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of history Is that every nation, oulture and civilization
brings destruction upon Itself by exceeding the bounds of
creatureliness..."41 But no word like "exceeding" can ever
describe the nature of a truly passive civilization, e.g.
India, or of a primitive and static civilization, e.g. Africa.
Civilization may acknowledge the misery man suffers by reason
of his involvement in the natural order as Buddhism surely
does. Or civilization may interpret the antagonism of nature
as some sort of cosmic ferocity as primitive animism has done.
But without Christianity's insight to the disciplinary nature
of man's estrangement from the cosmor suffering does not pro
voke man to high endeavor. Calvin realized this. Be said,
"Truly It is faith alone which can offer up such a sacrifice
the sacrifice of living under the curse to Ood..."48 The
curse, if it is to accomplish its intended purpose, must be
accepted as a divinely instituted ordeal for the improvement
of lost man. Hiebuhr *s conception of involvement Is that the
disharmony of man's environment is, after all, amoral. It is
part of the original state of man and needs no moral explana
tion; It is natural.
41 Relnhold Hiebuhr, Beyond Tragedy p. 140.
42 John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of
Moses Called Oenesis, translated By ToWTlng , (OrAnd Haplds,
Klchlgrthi Wm .' B . Ker<5man s Publishing Co., 1048), I, 176.
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A further deficiency in Hiebuhr' s realism is his omis-
�ion of the traditional view of Paradise and the Millennium
as historical events* The result of his rejection of Para
dise has been previously noted. If man did not fall from
Paradise he Is not in an unnatural state now, whatever his
inconvenience may be. And if there is no historical millen
nium then the Pauline promise of a restored cosmos45 is a
dream. Hiebuhr has nothing to substitute for the millennial
hope and the omission leads to a oon fused and very indefinite
treatment of eschatology. This is one of the manifest fail
ures of Hiebuhr 's scheme. He has no knowledge of the end of
history and the fault is the more apparent the nearer Hiebuhr
comes to the task of applying his thought to history's final
transaction. Thus, Hiebuhr has vitiated the Christian claim
as to man's true origin and the Christian hope of man's in
tended future. History is loose at both ends.
These heretical departures from the faith render
Hiebuhr, for the most part, unacceptable. But in spite of
his distance from orthodoxy he has seen much that belongs to
orthodoxy. His paramount contribution is the notion that
history, being what it is, can only produce what has been
produced, an ever increasing stateism. The future is not
open. He says, "The historical drama Is, in essence, not
43 Romans 8:19-2?.
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so muoh a contest between good and evil forces in history cb
a contest between e!1 ren and Ood."44 The justification of
history is not that the forces of good increasingly subdue
the forcea of evil. Christianity has always claimed that
only as Ood sovereignly moves upon history to establish His
will is the good ever triumphant. Man cannot rise above God's
sovereignty. His best success is but partial. Therefore his
tory is not moving toward an undefined future. Civilisation
is predetermined by the very nature of the historical ingredi
ent. There is something of an entelechy about civilization
and the emphasis is not only upon the goal, collectivism, to
ward which it necessarily moves but upon the limit, provinci
alism, beyond which it can never go.
The Niebuhrian historiography is distinguished from
earlier views in that it has thrown increased light upon the
quality cf civilizations. Formerly the peculiarities of the
various cultures were either ascribed to the will of God or
to the forces of nature. It was with all nations as with
Israel. They were chosen of Cod or they were not. They were
occupants of a promised lan^ or they were not. The categories
of God'? will and the forces of nature are surely valid con
siderations for the philosophy of history. But the mistake
has been in employing them to the exclusion of any other key.
44 Relnhold Nlebuhr, Faith and History p. 125.
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Consequently, these being transcendent factors in i an* a ex
perience�beyond his control, the dynamic quality of civili
zation was lost Bight of as the schedule of history gained
the prominence. It has been this later Interest, the sched
ule of history, which has filled the attention of the tradi
tional thinkers and where Hiebuhr is rich in thought they
are barren. Rightly grounded, his contribution could have
been a very welcome addition to the content of Christian
theology.
CHAPTrtR �11
CONCLUSION
I. THE NATURE AN1' SCOPE OF THE CURSE
Its nature. There have been two distinct ways of de
fining the curse: (1) as a divine decree imposed upon the
world in judgment of man's sin and (2) as the natural conse
quence of sin's impact upon the cosmos. These alternatives
have received various shades of emphasis throughout the his
tory of Christian thought. They are not mutually exclusive.
Augustine and Aquinas thought of the curse only in the con
text of the first oategory, as a divine decree. But Calvin
and Edwards conceived of It as both a decree and a natural
consequence. Edwards, however, stressed the later more than
the first. Nlebuhr, faithful to his disguised naturalism,
has regarded the adversity of life merely as part of the or
iginal and natural ord- r of things. He really has not thought
in terms of a curse of any kind.
But a soriptural definition must first isolate just
what Is to be included in The Curse as distinguished from les
ser curses and special instances of suffering. There are ex
amples of affliction, e.g. the sufferings of. Job, the chronic
troubles of rebellious Israel, etc, which clearly are not
part of the curse. The curse Is not restricted in time and
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place as are the above examples. The curse pervades all na
tions in all ages in all parts of the world. There are two
events which constitute the core of the curse: the curse im
mediately following the Fall and the confusion of tongues at
the Tower of Babel. These events are co-extensive with man's
mortal existence. Han cannot be thought of without reference
to them knowingly or unknowingly. It does not appear that
any other curse stands in this proportion to man's life.)
The Scripture surely supports the first definition.
The stages of the curse just cited were initiated by express
decree. The validity of the definition of the curse as a
natural consequence Is not so obvious. There are, however,
certain inferences from Scripture which, when drawn together,
vindicate this idea. The law of "sowing and reaping" is fore
most among these inferences.1 Then there Is a complex of in
ferences revealing the origiglnal rule of the Creator over
the cosmos,2 the suspension of that rule,3 its usurpation by
the devil,4 and the gradual5 and final6 restoration of the
1 Oalatlans 6:7.
2 Coloselans 1:16,17.
3 John 1:10,11.
4 Ephesians 2:2,
5 Luke 10:16; I John 3:8; Romans 8:22*
6 Ephesians 1:22; I Corinthians 15:24-28; I Peter 3:22.
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Creator's rule. This suspension of the Creator's intimate
relation to the cosmos is presented as altogether unnatural.
Its restoration Is the objeot of heaven's supreme effort and
its cause Is man's sin. Sin's natural consequence la the
breakdown of the original and natural order of things.
The nature of the curse as thus limited is that of a
finely ordered disharmony between man and nature. It is not
a blunt adversity crudely bludgeoning man. The deluge of
Noah's day simply destroyed man. It was not intricately re
lated to the future of the race through a subtle influence
upon every mo, mt of man's existence. But the curse so quail*
fled man as to set the perimeter of his vocational range, de
termine the psychology of the sexes, underscore his contin
gency, institute the Impassable barriers of culture divisions,
and thwart him in the mastery of environment. The curse is s
constant reference for both the impersonal, physical- temporal.
context of history and the personal, individual-community,
constituents of society.
It is teleologioal. The cosmos was not destroyed by
sin and the curse. Rather the whole order of things is amaz
ingly suited to bear and sustain the curse. The curse is
woven into every part of nature yet without undermining the
basic structure of the cosmos. Man's conquest of nature in
creasingly reveals that fact. Man cannot get beyond the
curse; It is a universal lnfeotion. The wonder of It is that
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a degradation so extensive and colossal should be so sdroit.
The curse expertly impinges upon man in such a way as to
secure from a modicum of frustration the maximum confession
of his own insufficiency.
Its scope. Three dimensions of man's life have been
invaded by the curse: the relation of man to his environment.
the relation of man to woman and the relation of the nations
to each other. Obviously there is no esoaping the curse.
The curse upon the cosmos and the sexes was in consideration
of man's individual sin. The curse upon the nations, the
confusion of tongues was in consideration of man's corporate
sin. In each case the curse struck at the very springboard
of the sin in question. The felicity between man and woman
in Eden together with the ideality of the environment were
prerequisite to man's temptation and sin. The trust between
man and woman and their ignorance of suffering, their rapport
with nature (the serpent) and their seeming independence of
Ood, their sense of mastery and privacy all contributed to the
experience of temptation and sin. And as for the sin of the
Tower-of-Babel-clvili?.ation, only the solidarity of oample te
cultural homogeneity could have permitted the kind of utter
most rebellion which was theirs. Cultural division would have
dissipated the sinful ambition of that society before it could
consolidate Itself for straight-forward rebellion against Ood,
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The curse of language diversity insured that society would
not easily devote Itself again to wholesale rebellion against
Ood.
Thus the curse probes nan's most basic relationships
and modifies him fundamentally* He can enter upon no venture*
save the remedy of his own spirit by faith in Christ, with
out encountering the galling power of the curse, it surrounds
him like a moat so that, as he finds hi- self hemmed In on
every mundane boundary, he is provoked to look away from the
scene of his confinement to eternity and freedom. The curse
is redemptive as well as punatlve.
II. THE CURSE AKL THE PHILOSOPHY OP HISTORY
The by-product of the curse Is civilization, collect
ive living. The curse surrounds man and is a barrier to him
but it is a goad. It provokes him to special effort* And as
he devotes himself to the problem of the curse he mounts the
barrier placed before him. It Is the sum- total of this re-
si stanee to the curse thst is called civilisation. But the
ourse is not a stairway to a future, unmitigated mastery. It
is like a hurdle. Kan rises to each occasion but he does not
permanently ascend it. He is, after all he can do, still un
der the sentence of death. He may soften the curse and delay
its claim but he cannot remove it*
Hot all societies have given evi enoe of just this
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response tc the curse. If they had then all societies would
be more or less equal for the curse Is universal. But noth
ing is plainer than societal Inequality. The explanation
lies In the fact that without the Hebrew-Christ!an revelation
of the nature and importance of adversity suffering fails to
accomplish the divine intent. The curse, without the memory
of Eden and all that it implies, is an inscrutable phenomenon.
It bewilders and embitters man so that he le not able for his
best effort. He succumbs to adversity as in the case of the
passive civilizations of the Orient or fails to make real pro
gress in his resistance to it as in the case of certain fatal
istic civilizations of the Near last. Islam, for example�
since it incorporates much of the Hebrew-Christian tradition
but has not achieved the greatness of Western civilization,
is one of the supreme difficulties for any philosophy of his
tory. And none but the Christian philosophy of history can
explain the status of Islam because no explanation is possible
apart from a right understanding of the societal importance
of the curse and the memory of Eden.
Contrary to modern evolutionary conceptions of history
the movement of history is not forward. Fgither is it cycli
cal as the Creeks claimed. Such movement pb there is in his
tory (mere societal existence or identity does not insure pro
gress or distinction between pest and present) is "backward"
to Eden. The effort of civilization is a cultural return to
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Paradise* Unless roan conceives of his rightful lot as para
disical there is no likelihood that he will spend himself In
attempting to return to Utopia.
It may seem that this claim is set aside by the promi
nence of optimism within modem evolutionism. Evolutionism
certainly appears to be looking for a very bright future in
which the longings of history are fulfilled. It seems to
believe in some kind of paradise. Therefore it would appear
that the evolutionary description of history stands on the
same plane as the Christian description. They both employ the
category of paradise and that one thinks of paradise as past
and the other as future might be considered incidental. One
has anchored history at the point of origin and jttie other at
the point of destiny. But this distinction can never describe
the dissimilarity between these opposite concepts of paradise.
Christianity thinks of paradise as something bestowed upon man
and as part of the original constitution off the natural order.
His separation from it has a moral connotation. Evolution
thinks of paradise as something to be achieved by man and as
part of the final issue of life. His separation from it has
merely a biological connotation.
It is this moral factor emphasized by Christianity which
must accompany man's interest in paradise If his suocess toward
paradise is to endure. Without it his success inevitably
becomes self-destructive. Only as civilisation is tempered
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by the admission of sin end guilt doss it abold the exess of
leisure, security and indulgence which success affords.
That civilization which is built upon an amoral concept of
paradise inevitably faces decay from within. Evidence is
abundant in the case of the present trend to dissolution
within Western civilization. It has embraced paradise. It
has devoted itself unstintingly to the task of gaining Utopia.
But Western civilization has forgotten that its knowledge of
paradise was borrowed from Christianity. It has severed the
Christian doctrine of paradise from its concomitant doctrine
of the fall. Likewise it has denied the Christian doctrine
of sin and guilt. The moral breakdown consequent upon this
denlsl Is well under way on the Continent, if not in America
as well.
The proceeding observations are but the more obvious
implications of the curse. They in no way constitute an ade�
quate expose of the curse and history. They merely indicate
something of the apologetic wealth of an established but un-
exploited doctrine. An adequate study would Involve a proper
relating of the curse to other doctrines. For example the
shattering of the people of the earth Into the peoples of the
earth at Babel ought to be contrasted with the gift of
tongues st Penteoos t snd with the flew Testament Church as the
fulfillment of the nations. No national group exhausts the
concept, man. It takes all nations to show what man is. And
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apart from the Christian Ideal of the Church there la no tru
ly universal and restored society.
Then, the dispensational schedule of history should be
reworked to include the relationship of the Tower of Babel to
Armageddon. The Tower of Babel and Armageddon are identical
morally. Man, at Babel, enjoyed cultural solidarity and used
It to launch a total war against Cod. Ood thrust man down
under the confusion of tongues. Armageddon is the prophecy
that man will modify that barrier. Antichrist will have led
the nations in bridging the cultural gaps sufficiently to
once again present a world-front of defiance. (This Is why
Jesus designates the reign of antichrist as the ultimate in
human sin;7 and why Paul warns that Just when peace seems
Biost certain destruction is raopt immanent,� Prom man's stand
point solidarity Is security and peaoe, but from Ood's it is
complete rebellion.) Thus, there will be no turning back from
Armageddon. It is to be man's ultimate achievement. As an
ultimate, an ultimate of sin, it must be utterly destroyed.
The life of civilization will have run its complete course.
Moreover, what is true of society, as revealed In the
TOA-er of Babel and Armageddon, is true of the Individual,
7 Matthew 24:4-28.
8 II These&lonlans 5:5.
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Every man who realizes his own guilt an.' distance from para
dise because of sin without repentance assumes an irremdial
moral posture. He stands before Ood as the first and last
sinner. He sides with Adam's demise and aligns himself with
all its consequences. He Is truly sinful. There is nothing
left to Mm but destruction.
Assuredly Christianity's conception of history Is
equal to those challenging It. It simplifies the random
stuff of history and it does Justice to history's extreme
complexity. It fathoms the life of both the individual and
the community. It presents more of the detail of man's ori
gin and destiny than any oth r view and It squares with ex
perience. Above all, and this is the final test, it accounts
for the rise and fall of civilizations. It remains, however,
an uncharted frontier within the intellectual domain of
Christianity.
7r>
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